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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN L. HALL and VERONA W. 
HALL, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
GRACE M. BINGHAM, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to establish boundary line between 
adjacent properties based on long established fenceline 
ratified by written agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant-Respondent filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on records filed in the proceedings and 
the transcript of proceedings had in the court on the 24th 
day of October, 1973, and exhibits entered therein. The 
case was heard by the Honorable Calvin Gould, who 
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issued a bench ruling on February 20, 1974, in favor of 
respondent holding in effect that a Warranty Deed exe-
cuted by Plaintiffs-Appellants in 1962 precluded Appel-
lants from claiming old fenceline as boundary line, even 
though said line was subsequently ratified and re-estab-
lished by written agreement executed contemporaneously 
with the execution of the Warranty Deed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants-Plaintiffs ask that the judgment of the 
lower court be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants and Respondent are adjacent land owners. 
Appellants purchased their property some time in the 
year 1937 (R. 63, Line 10). Respondent purchased the 
property adjacent and north of Appellants' land in April 
of 1972 (R. 77, Lines 11 and 12). Appellants built a home 
on the property in which they have resided for the past 
13 years (R. 63, Lines 12 and 13). The property had 
been separated by an old fence in existence prior to 1950 
(R. 60, Lines 11 and 12; R. 82, Lines 2 through 5; R. 83, 
Lines 11 through 12; R. 84, Lines 1 through 2). Appel-
lants had planted an orchard, shrubs and lawn on their 
side of the fence, all visible to Respondent prior to the 
time of her purchase (R. 84, Lines 18 through 25; 
R. 85. Lines 1 through 20). The Appellants in 1962 
executed a deed conveying title to Simmons and 
Wiberg the property claimed by the Respondent. 
At or about the same time of signing said Deed, 
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Simmons and Wiberg executed an agreement by and 
through their (Secretary-Treasurer, Ruth E. Simmons, 
(R. 257) acknowledging, acquiescing in, and accepting 
the existing fenceline as the dividing line between the 
properties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC 
REMEDY AND SHOULD BE GRANTED 
O N L Y W H E N U N D E R T H E FACTS 
VIEWED MOST FAVORABLE TO THIS 
APPELLANT HE SHOULD NOT RECOVER 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insur-
ance Co., (1958) 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P. 2d 264, the Utah 
Supreme Court said at page 265, 
"The Motion for Summary Judgment is, in 
effect, a demurrer to the contentions of the ad-
verse party, saying: 'Conceding the facts to be 
as you claim, there is no basis for a recovery'.". 
The position of the Utah court is also very clearly 
spelled out in Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P. 
2d 410, decided by the Utah Supreme Court in 1959, the 
court said at page 411, 
"Summary Judgment is a drastic remedy and 
the court should be reluctant to deprive litigants 
of an opportunity to fully present their conten-
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tions upon trial. It should be granted only when 
under the facts viewed in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff he cannot recover as a mat-
ter of law/' 
The evidence before the court viewed most favorable 
to appellant shows an old existing fence line long ac-
quiesced in and subsequently acknowledged by written 
agreement to be the true boundary line between the 
properties of Appellants and Respondent. 
THE VITAL ISSUE in the case at bar is whether 
a written agreement by adjacent property owners, ratify-
ing, acquiescing in and re-establishing an old fenceline 
boundary as the true boundary between the properties can 
be nullified by a deed executed concurrent with said writ-
ten agreeemnt, said deed unknowingly bearing a different 
boundary description than intended and contained in the 
agreement, contrary to the intentions, desires and actions 
of the parties. 
Respondent's position is that the deed executed con-
currently with the written agreement nullifies the writ-
ten agreement and controls the boundary regardless of 
the intent of the parties to the agreement. 
If Respondent's position prevails, agreements of con-
tracting parties become unstable and cannot be relied 
upon, thereby sustaining form over substance. In the 
instant case, Appellents' and Respondent's predecessor 
in interest entered into an agreement acquiescing in and 
ratifying a boundary line. Respondent now seeks to 
nullify that written agreement and acquiescence on a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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technicality. If Respondent's position is upheld, boun-
dary line agreements between adjacent land owners will 
become unreliable. 
In International Paper Company v. J. T. Bridges, 
the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit (1960), 
279 F. 2d, p. 536 said: 
"Appealing from the judgment, appellant is here 
insisting that there were and are in the case 
genuine issues of material facts and that, in dis-
posing of the cause by summary judgments, the 
district judge deprived the plaintiff of a trial 
upon the issues tendered by it in its pleadings 
and supported by its affidavits. These issues 
were and are: (1) whether the lines which plain-
tiff claims as the true boundary between it and 
defendant is the true line, as established by the 
Harris Survey in 1821, under which both plain-
tiff and defendant claim; (2) whether, if it is not 
the true line as originally established, it is the 
boundary line between plaintiff and defendant, 
established by agreement and acquiescence; and 
(3) whether plaintiff's affidavits made and ten-
dered an issue of prior possession which, though 
controverted by the affidavits of the defendant, 
could be resolved only by trial. 
"We find ourselves in full agreement with these 
contentions. The suit is in its essence a boun-
dary suit, and in its determination on this record, 
summary judgment had no place." 
The United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 
went on to say: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"In granting the motion for final summary judg-
ment, the court incorrectly resolved as matter of 
law factual controversies presented by the con-
flicting affidavits filed by plaintiff and defendant, 
which could only be resolved on a trial." 
Appellants are entitled to a trial to present evidence 
of their claims that an old fenceline is the true line be-
tween the parties, and whether, if not the true line as 
originally established, it is the boundary line established 
by subsequent agreement and acquiescence. The evidence 
put forward to the court can only be resolved by trial. 
POINT II. 
THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN TWO 
ADJOINING LAND OWNERS MAY BE ES-
TABLISHED BY WRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
"Where the boundary line between two adjoining 
land owners is uncertain, they may agree on a division 
line between them, and when executed each will own up 
to this line as if it were a natural boundary, or as if their 
deeds or grants called for it, particularly if the agreement 
is evidenced by a writing signed by the parties thereto." 
11 C. J. S., Boundaries, Section 64, p. 636. 
In Finley v. Funk, 35 Kan. 59, 16 P. 15, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas on page 19 said: 
"This agreement is somewhat ambiguous in its 
terms, but the majority of the court are of the 
opinion that it is valid, and that the petition 
states a cause of action. The view taken by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
court is that all the provisions of the agreement 
must be taken together; and if, by any reasonable 
construction, it can be upheld, it should be done. 
By this agreement the parties sought to settle 
a perplexing question of boundaries, and avoid 
what may might be a protracted and expensive 
litigation. The agreement is one they had a 
right to make, and its purpose is looked upon by 
the courts with favor. It has been said, in a 
case where disputed boundary lines were in-
volved, that 'it is the policy of the law to allow 
parties to settle and adjust doubtful and disputed 
facts between themselves; and, when such a 
matter, which before was uncertain, has been 
established by agreement between the parties 
upon good consideration passing between them, 
they are not permitted afterwards to deny it.' 
Bosberg. v. Teator, 32 N. Y. 567." 
The Kansas Court further said: 
"The fact that the parties entered into an agree-
ment is evidence that they desired as far as pos-
sible to waive and dispense with formalities; and, 
even if the agreement were formally defective, 
the court should seek to uphold it, and carry 
out the obvious intent of the parties." 
In the above case there was a lapse of two years be-
tween the time of the agreement (June 11, 1884) and 
the date of the court decision (October 7, 1886). A writ-
ten agreement here did not require any appreciable time 
lapse to become enforceable. 
In 12 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 613 and 614, it is stated: 
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"It is well settled that where the boundary lines 
of adjoining land owners are not definitely known 
or their location is in dispute, such owners may 
establish the lines either by a written agreement, 
conveyance, or parole agreement. Such boun-
dary lines may also be established by the parties' 
mutual recognition of, and acquiescence in, cer-
tain lines as the true boundary lines, the courts 
being reluctant to interfere therewith after the 
lines have been permitted to exist over such a 
period of time that satisfactory proof of the true 
lines is difficult." 
In the case at bar when the evidence is viewed most 
favorable to Plaintiffs-Appellants, we have a fence estab-
lished by long acquiescence, later reaffirmed by written 
agreement, and further acquiesced in, all which entitled 
Plaintiffs-Appellants to a trial. Defendant-Respondent 
should be estopped to deny that the fence line established 
and acquiesced in by her predecessors in interest, is the 
true boundary between Appellants and Respondent. 
Respondent would negate the written agreement be-
tween Appellants' and Respondent's predecessor in inter-
est for lack of consideration. However, "Doubt and un-
certainty constitute consideration for an oral agreement 
establishing a boundary line." 69 A. L. R. p. 1456. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A warranty deed was executed by the Appellants 
to Simmons and Wiberg, predecessors in interest to the 
Respondent (R. p. 67, Lines 5 through 7). A written 
agreement had been entered into between the said Sim-
mons and Wiberg, and Appellants dated March 13, 1962 
(R. p. 67, Lines 1 through 3). This makes a period of 
11 years of acquiescence since the date of said deed and 
agreement and the purchase by Respondent. 
In Ekberg, et ux. v. Bate, et ux., (1951), 121 Utah 
123, 239 P. 2d 205, at page 208, the Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
"In the instant case as we have pointed out 
above, there was a period of actual acquiescence 
for more than seven years (the Utah limitations 
period for adverse possession) before appellants 
acquired their title and under all circumstances 
shown herein there was a sufficient length of 
time to establish the line so that appellants are 
precluded from claiming that it is not the true 
line." 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated its position 
concerning boundary by acquiescence in Brown v. Milliner, 
(1951), 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2d 202, p. 207, as Mows: 
"We have further held in this state that in the 
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoin-
ing property or their predecessors in interest 
ever expressly agreed as to the location of the 
boundary between them, if they have occupied 
their respective premises up to an open boundary 
line visably marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings for a long period of time and mutually 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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recognized it as the dividing line between them, 
the law will imply an agreement fixing the boun-
dary as located, if it can do so consistently with 
the facts appearing, and will not permit the 
parties nor their grantees to depart from such 
line. Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009, 
. . . In Holmes v. Judge, supra, we declared that 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 'rest 
upon sound public policy, with a view of pre-
venting strife and litigation concerning boundar-
ies' and that 'While the interest of society re-
quire that the title to real estate shall not be 
transferred from the owner for slight cause, or 
otherwise than by law, the same interests de-
mand that there shall be stability in boundar-
ies'. . ." 
The Utah Supreme Court has long upheld boundar-
ies established by acquiescence. In the instant case the 
record indicates that there was an old fence of at 
least 23 years and in addition that there had been subse-
quent written agreement predating the claim by the Re-
spondent by 11 years. In the Ekberg case, cited above, 8 
years was found to be sufficient time for the establish-
ment of a boundary by acquiescence under the circum-
stances of that case. The lower court in the case at bar 
in ruling from the bench acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
In boundary by acquiescence cases, each case is dis-
tinct and must be resolved on its own facts. Plaintiffs-
Appellants should be granted a trial to present their 
claims. The Utah Supreme Court in Ekberg v. Bates 
cited above said: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The length of time necessary to establish a 
boundary line by acquiescence has never been 
definitely established in this jurisdiction. Each 
case must usually be determined on its own facts. 
In other jurisdictions there have been statements 
made which indicate that the length of time 
should be at least that prescribed by the Statute 
of Limitations. See headnote to Annotation, 
69 A. L. R. p. 1491; Birdsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 
537, 54 N. W. 740; Johnson v. Trump, 161 Iowa 
512, 143 N. W. 510; and Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 
740, 278 P. 366, 367, in which case the court 
there said: "* * * 'While the authorities 
are hopelessly confused and generously uncer-
tain as to the time the acquiescence as to the 
location of the boundary line should continue in 
order to satisfy the rule, it is but logical to say 
that such acquiescence must continue for a per-
iod of not less than five years, thus conforming 
to the period established by the statute of limi-
tation in cases of adverse possession, * * *'" 
POINT IV. 
COURTS HAVE LONG ACCEPTED THE 
PRINCIPAL THAT PARTIES SHOULD BE 
A L L O W E D TO MAKE THEIR AGREE-
MENTS AND THEREBY BE BOUND BY 
THEM TO LIMIT THE CONSTANT AND 
EVER-PRESENT POSSIBILITY OF F U -
TURE LITIGATION. 
In 69 A. L. R. p. 1485 the problem is well analyzed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"And it has been held that the rule applies, al-
though the period of acquiescence in such agreed 
boundary has not been long enough to confer 
rights by limitation. Coleman v. Smith (1881), 
55 Tex. 254. In that case it was said: 'The val-
idity of an agreement for the settlement of the 
boundary does not depend at all upon accuracy 
with which the line is run. Whether the parties 
were right or wrong in their belief that the line 
they established and agreed upon as the boun-
dary of their lands was precisely where it ought 
to be, or where the original surveyor made it, 
was wholely immaterial. It was enough if there 
were doubt or dispute between them about it, 
and they determined to settle it upon that basis. 
If absolute exactness in defining the line were 
necessary to render such an agreement binding, 
it is not easy to perceive how it could be at-
tained. Different surveyors with different in-
struments might locate the true line at different 
places. An agreement made today upon the 
survey of one might be set aside tomorrow upon 
that of another, perhaps no less skillful or accur-
ate. This would be to make agreements nuga-
tory; whereas they are to be encouraged, favored, 
and upheld, especially in these cases of doubtful 
boundaries. Such cases are proverbally vexa-
tious, and breed ill blood; and they are very apt 
to arise in this country. It is notorious that 
surveys have been hitherto very loosely made, 
and often by incompetent surveyors. Lines have 
been insufficiently marked in corners designated 
by perishable objects. In the settling of the 
country and the destroying axe of the settler 
and time, have obliterated the path of the sur-
veyor and destroyed the monuments he made. 
And so, when the lines he ran cannot now be 
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run, and the boundaries he fixed have become 
of doubtful identity, and the parties to be 
effected by them have mutually agreed that here 
he fixed his lines and set their bounds, such 
agreement should be held conclusive; not sub-
ject to be set aside or reopened upon any sub-
sequent discovery that possibly a mistake was 
made in that agreement as to the true locality'." 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Provonsha v. 
Pitman, (1957), 6 Utah 2d 26, 305 P. 2d 486, p. 487 that: 
". . . If by that time a boundary by acquiescence 
has been established, and we think it had, under 
principles heretofore announced by this court, 
succeeding Grantees could not marshall their 
disagreements or misunderstandings to destroy 
that established boundary." 
The agreement of parties concerning a boundary 
line, long acquiesced in, or placed in writing have been 
and should be upheld by the courts to give stability to 
their agreements and to property lines acquiesced in for 
a period of few or many years. 
POINT V. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT HAD NOTICE 
OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' CLAIM ON 
THE LAND IN QUESTION PRIOR TO PUR-
CHASE AND SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO 
DENY PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
That there was ample evidence of a claim by Plain-
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tiffs-Appellants of the land in question is evident from 
the record (R. 78, Lines 18 through 21; R. 82, Lines 2 
through 5; R. 84, Lines 1 and 2, Lines 11 through 13, 
Lines 17 through 25; R. 85, Lines 1 through 5). 
In 66 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 441: 
«* * * gU£ m e r e failure to record an instru-
ment does not work an estoppel where the per-
son asserting the estoppel was charged with no-
tice of the true state of the title. * * *" 
In 66 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 445 it is stated: 
"* * * The words 'bona fide purchaser/ 
therefore, when introduced into the recording 
acts, were intended to be in accordance with the 
established meaning. To entitle one to the pro-
tection provided for bona fide purchasers by the 
recording acts, it has been held to be essential: 
(1) that he be the purchaser of the legal as dis-
tinguished from an equitable title; (2) that his 
purchase was in good faith; (3) that he parted 
with a valuable consideration therefor by paying 
money or other thing of value, assuming a lia-
bility, or incurring an injury; and (4) that he 
had no notice, and knew no facts sufficient to 
put him on inquiry as to the other's equity, 
either at the time of purchase, or at or before 
the time he paid the purchased money, or other-
wise parted with such value" 
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake, Garfield and 
Western Railway Co., a corporation v. Allied Materials 
Co., a corporation, Ketchum Builders Supply Co., a cor-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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poration, (1955), 4 Utah 2d 218, 291 P. 2d 883, p. 886, 
quoted from 39 Am. Jur., Sec. 18, p. 242 as follows: 
"'Possession of land is notice to the world of 
every right that the possessor has therein, legal 
or equitable; it is a fact putting all persons on 
inquiry as to the nature of the occupant's claims 
as well as the claims of the persons under whom 
he occupies. Possession is notice, however, of 
only such facts as inquiry of the occupant would 
naturally disclose, * * *. Where a purchaser 
is in possession under an unrecorded deed, his 
possession is notice of his title, * * V " 
The Utah Court goes on to say: 
"Defendants made no inquiry of plaintiff al-
though the plaintiff's railroad ran adjacent to 
defendants' land and notwithstanding plaintiff's 
poles, guy wires and trolley wires were within 
the description of defendants' land. 
"We are of the opinion that defendants had con-
structive notice of the claims and rights of plain-
tiff in and to the land in question by reason of 
the poles, guy wires and trolley wires on the 
premises claimed by the defendants and by rea-
son of the reservation recited deeds from defen-
dants as predecessor in title." 
Respondent having had constructive notice which 
would readily have revealed to them upon reasonable in-
quiry any and all claims of appellants should be estopped 
from denying that the old fenceline in existence at the 
time of their purchase is in fact the true boundary be-
tween the parties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellants urge that the decision of the lower 
court be reversed and the matter remanded for trial. It 
is abundantly clear from the evidence which has been 
made part of this record, including the transcripts of the 
hearings, that there has been an old fence line long ac-
quiesced in as the boundary line between the property 
owners and their predecessors in interest; which acqui-
escence and subsequent written agreement ratify and 
further acquiescing in said boundary line should not be 
be lightly ignored, cancelled or vacated by the court. 
There are sufficient facts and law before the court to en-
title Appellant to a trial on the issues. Granting summary 
judgment in the instant case was capricious and arbitrary 
and not justified by the evidence before the court. The 
lower court decision should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FROERER, HOROWITZ, 
PARKER, THORNLEY, 
CRITCHLOW & JENSEN 
Robert E. Froerer, Esquire 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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